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I
INTRODUCTION

The legitimacy of the criminal law rests on the conception of public
morality that a society regards as justly enforceable.' This conception of
public morality has two components: a theory of morally wrong acts and a
theory of culpability attributing blame for such acts. 2 It also defines a
corresponding theory of the moral virtues that the society praises and the
moral vices that it condemns, because moral virtue is, at least in part, the
effective desire and capacity to be free of culpable wrongdoing, and moral
vice is the propensity to be guilty of such wrongdoing.3 Societies differ in
their conceptions of public morality, defining the moral universe of
wrongdoing, culpability, and vice in correspondingly different ways.
What is the conception of enforceable public morality appropriate in a
liberal society? John Stuart Mill gave the classic liberal answer to this
question in the terms of his harm principle. 4 According to this principle,
subject to background duties of justice and fair contribution, the coercive
power of the state can only be imposed for acts causing harms to other
persons. Harms to self do not suffice. 5 Mill justified the harm principle in
terms of a doctrinal utilitarianism that is, in fact, inconsistent with the
stringent demands that the principle imposes on the proper scope of the
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criminal law. It often appears to be the case that the utilitarian goal of the
greatest aggregate sum of pleasure over pain is better achieved by the tribal
solidarity of collective social intolerance, which the harm principle clearly
condemns. 6 An alternative political theory is needed that explains how and
why the harm principle intuitively identifies the constraints that liberalism
imposes on the conception of enforceable public morality.
This article adopts the working premise that liberalism does indeed
express a distinctive normative attitude to the public morality justly
enforceable through the criminal law and takes American constitutional
liberalism as a case study in the analysis of this distinctive public morality.
Accordingly, this article seeks to clarify the liberal conception of enforceable
public morality through reference to the internal struggles against alternative
conceptions of enforceable public morality that distinctively mark the
emergence of American constitutional liberalism in particular, and liberal
political theory in general.
The nature of constitutional liberalism (reflected in both the theory and
practice of both the United States Constitution of 1787-88 and the Bill of
Rights of 1791) was a product of the Founders' rejection of the theories of
virtue and vice as related to public morality assumed by classical republican
tradition. 7 The liberal conception of public morality can be best understood
by contrasting it with the alternative view that it self-consciously rejected.
With this purpose in mind, this article examines the nature of the rejection of
the classical republican tradition, the correlative rejection of the perfectionist
theories of virtue and vice as the political psychology of republicanism, and
the alternative conception of a constitutional republic that this rejection made
possible. In this way, this article will clarify the alternative conception of
republican public morality that motivates this rejection, its philosophical roots
in Lockean liberalism, and the principled constitutional rejection of
established churches through which America institutionalized that liberalism.
This approach responds to the need for a nonutilitarian basis for the harm
principle through an alternative understanding of both the derivation and
interpretation of the harm principle as a central principle of liberal
constitutionalism. The argument also suggests reasons for skepticism about
the contemporary revival of Aristotelian virtue theory."
Finally, the approach proposed in this article casts interpretive light on
one of the most controversial issues in American public law: the inference
and elaboration of the constitutional right to privacy. This article illustrates
6. See D. RICHARDS, SEX, DRUGS, DEATH AND THE LAw: AN ESSAY ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND
OVERCRIMINALIZATION 2-7 (1982) [hereinafter SEX, DRUGS, DEATH]; D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND
THE CONSTITUTION 237-42 (1986) [hereinafter D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION].
7. For a general description of this tradition, see J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT

(1975). For another argument that the Founders significantly rejected the classical republican
tradition, seeJ. DIGGINS, THE LOST SOUL OF AMERICAN POLITICS 18-130 (1984); Diamond, Ethics and
Politics: The American Way, in THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 75 (R. Horwitz 3d
ed. 1986).
8. See generally A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1981).

Page 123: Winter 1988)

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY

that the constitutional right to privacy is the principled interpretive
elaboration of a longstanding constitutional skepticism about state
enforcement of certain conceptions of perfectionist public morality, a
skepticism that framed the Founders' general approach to the framing of the
Constitution. The article, therefore, suggests that it is profoundly ahistorical
to regard the constitutional right to privacy as foreign to either the text,
history, or political theory of the United States Constitution. To the contrary,
the constitutional right to privacy corresponds to some of the most brilliant
and innovative insights of the Founders about the political pathologies of
faction that a well constructed republican constitution must address.
Constitutional privacy was not foreign to the Founders' intent, and it is a mark
of our debased public understanding of the Founders' project that the
rhetoric of the Founders' intent has recently been so abusively used against
the inference and elaboration of the constitutional right to privacy.
II
THE REJECTION OF CLASSICAL REPUBLICANISM

From its inception, American constitutionalism has distinguished its
republican aspirations from the classical democratic models of antiquity and
the Renaissance, 9 with their Aristotelian' ° and Machiavellian" foci on the
actively engaged citizen-soldier.
The model classical society was one in which political participation was the
central activity of civilized life. In Athens, this was made possible by a social
structure based upon slavery and sexism. 12 Correlatively, Athens proudly
touted its regime of free speech as an aspect of the ultimate evaluative aim of
democratic participation.1 3 Absent from this conception is any valorization of
a legitimately private sphere immune from politics. Pericles bluntly made this
point: "We do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man
who minds his own business; we say that he has no business here at all."' 4
Family life, for example, was contemptuously remitted to the morally inferior
class of women, whose labor was given weight only insofar as it released men
for public life.' 5 Work was for slaves, thus releasing citizens for civic life in
the agora. 16 Socratic individualism, including its uses of free speech, was not
9. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 61-65 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). For extended
comparisons, seeJ. ADAMS, A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America, in 4
C. ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 472-492 (1851) [hereinafter A Defense]. For fuller
examination, see D. RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (forthcoming, 1989).

10.
11.

See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 92-110 (E. Barker trans. 1962).
See, e.g., MACHIAVELLI, THE DISCOURSES 265-90 (L. Walker trans., B. Crick ed. 1970).

12. See generally Rahe, The Primacy of Politics in Ancient Greece, 89 AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW
265 (1984); M. FINLEY, POLITICS IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 70-85 (1983); M. FINLEY, DEMOCRACY

ANCIENT AND MODERN 15-38 (1985).
13. See Pericles' Funeral Oration, in THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 147 (R.
Warner trans. 1954).

14.
15.

Id.
See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, supra note 10, at 8-38.
16. Id. at 9-17. For pertinent discussion of changing conceptions of work, see H. ARENDT, THE
HUMAN CONDITION 136-137 (1959).
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only misunderstood by the political system, it was also ruthlessly persecuted
for its individualistic moral conception which legitimated uses of free speech
that were taken by the Athenian democracy to be impious and heretical, and
7
thus worthy of death.'
Of course, the classical conception specifies an elaborate theory of
democratically controlled collective political life.' 8 But that conceptionprecisely because of its emphasis on collective mass participation-identifies
the moral aims of democracy with voting and participation, and their
constitutive role in the flowering of such human excellences as civic
generosity, military courage, heroism, and patriotism-in other words, the
perfectionist virtues of Aristotelian ethics.19

Theories of normative ethics are commonly distinguished into teleological
and deontological types. 20 Teleological theories define "right" actions in
terms of the tendency of those actions to result in the greatest net aggregate
of goods over evils. Deontological theories are those that do not define right
action in such terms. Perfectionist moral theory is a teleological theory that
defines the relevant goods and evils in terms of the greatest exercise and
display of talent, creativity, and general excellence, including artistic and
intellectual performance, and military courage and prowess. Aristotle's
perfectionism, like Nietzsche's, 2 ' assumes that these qualities are unequally
distributed, and thus justifies, as a matter of normative principle, both slavery
and the subjugation of women 22 as ways to realize perfectionist ends. For
example, artists or patriotic men are relieved from having to do work that
frustrates their capacity to realize the only goods of ultimate moral worth,
23
namely, superior achievement of talent, creativity, and general excellence.
Aristotelian perfectionism, thus understood, was fundamentally elitist, and
perceived slavery and the subjugation of women as wholly natural, indeed
morally required, ways to preserve the proper role of the talented elite.
Classical republicanism assumed these perfectionist aims and thus viewed the
extraordinary demands of classical republican participation as instrumental in
the full flowering of human excellence. In particular, the moral theory of
classical republicanism emphasized perfectionist heroism in the service of the
ultimate unit of value, the polis, which defined the indispensable context for
the fostering and display of the elitist human excellences. Democratic
17. Socrates makes precisely this predictive point about his own fate at the hands of his fellow
Athenians in PLATO, GORGIAS 101-02 (T. Irwin trans. 1979).
18. See, M. FINLEY, POLITICS IN THE ANCIENT WORLD, supra note 12, at 63-69.
19. See generally ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (M. Ostwald trans. 1962).
20. SeeJ. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 25-27, 30 (1971).
21. For a fuller discussion, see D. RICHARDS, supra note 2, at 116-17.
22. For a fuller discussion and relevant citations, see D. RICHARDS, supra note 2, at 117.
23. Contemporary forms of perfectionist moral theory are not, of course, inevitably wedded to
such conclusions. See generally V. HAKSAR, EQUALITY, LIBERTY, AND PERFECTIONISM (1979); J. RAZ,
THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986). An alternative kind of teleological theory, namely, utilitarianism,
identifies goods and evils in terms of pleasures and pains that are, in principle, more equally
distributed among all sentient creatures than the excellences of Aristotelian perfectionism. See
generally H. SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS (1962).
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participation was valued as the matrix for the exercise and display of these
perfectionist virtues.
The classical republican conception lacks the ideal of self-government that
motivates liberal democratic constitutionalism, and it is this difference that
explains at least three of the reasons why the drafters of the 1787 Constitution
rejected the classical republican conception. First, the drafters of the United
States Constitution repudiated the mass democratic participation in
government that was central to classical republicanism. Madison, with
characteristic precision, denied the claim made by other Founders that the
representative principle was completely unknown to classical democratic
polities. 24 Rather, he argued that
[t]he true distinction between these and the American Governments lies in the total
exclusion of the people in their collective capacity from any share in the latter, and not in the
total exclusion of representatives of the people, from the administration of the former. The
distinction however thus qualified must be admitted to leave a most advantageous
superiority in favor of the United States. But to ensure to this advantage its full effect,
we must 2 be
careful not to separate it from the other advantage, of an extensive
5
territory.

Madison identified such mass assemblies with the mob rule that had
discredited republicanism as an acceptable form of constitutional
government:
In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever characters composed, passion never fails
citizen been a Socrates, every
to wrest the sceptre from reason. Had every Athenian
26
Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.

Accordingly, a properly designed republican constitution must, Madison
argued, use the representative principle to preserve republican accountability,
and also to structure democratic politics in legislative assemblies so as to
better achieve the end of republican government, which Madison identified
with "U]ustice. ' '2 7 Madison's reference to the "extensive territory" of the
United States echoes his earlier argument in No. 10 of The Federalist, that the
representative principle operating over such a large territory and population
would channel democratic politics in ways more likely to lead to certain
substantive results like securing "the rights of other citizens, or . . . the
28
permanent and aggregate interests of the community."

A second reason for the Founders' rejection of the classical republican
conception was that they did not construe rights to vote for, and participate
in, government as being the highest social values. Rather, they saw these
rights as means to ensure that the state will respect individual rights and
pursue the public good. Indeed, from this characteristically Lockean and
24. In his opening address to the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, James Wilson stated: "One
fact, however, is certain, that the ancients had no idea of representation, that essential to every
system of wise, good, and efficient government." See 2 M. JENSEN, THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 343 (1976).
25. THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 428 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
26. THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 374 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
27. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 352 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
28. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 57 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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liberal perspective, voting rights are not themselves the ends of republican
politics, but the means to independently specified ends. As such they may be
defined, limited, and weighted in whatever ways are most likely to secure
these ends (including, for example, the property qualifications common in
American politics in 1787).29 Of course, from its beginning, American
democratic constitutionalism has distributed the franchise more broadly than
comparable democracies (for example, Great Britain 3 0 ), and the progressive
historical elaboration of constitutional principles (including the 15th, 19th,
and 26th amendments) has expanded the scope of the democratic franchise
still more broadly and more equitably (for example, reapportionment of
voting power in accord with one person/one vote 31 ). It is wholly consistent
with the spirit of the American conception of voting rights that, as the
maldistribution of voting rights is perceived to frustrate effective respect for
equal rights under law and fair pursuit of the public good, the scope and
distribution of such voting rights should in these ways be more fully and fairly
extended in service of these goals.
The final reason for the drafters' rejection of classical republicanism was
their deep distrust of the concept's perfectionist virtues of civic generosity
and military heroism as the reigning political psychology of a well-functioning
polity. Madison, for example, identified the political psychology of faction as
a central evil of political life:
By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or
minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of
passion, or of interest, adverse to the ri3 hts of other citizens, or to the permanent and
aggregate interests of the community. S

He condemned classical republicanism for the uninhibited play it gave faction
thus understood:
Such Democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have even
been found incompatible with personal security, or the rights of property; and have in
general been as short in their lives, as they have been violent in their deaths.
Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of Government, have
erroneously supposed, that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political
rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly
equalized and assimilated in their
33
possessions, their opinions, and their passions.

From this perspective, the perfectionist public morality of ancient Sparta-so
admired by Rousseau 34-expresses yet another form of faction, a thought
John Adams put with characteristic bluntness:
See J. POLE, POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN ENGLAND AND THE ORIGINS OF THE
25, 31, 36, 84, 136, 170, 208 (1966). See also W. ADAMS, THE FIRST
CONSTITrrTIONS 164, 196-217, 293-307 (R. Kimber & R. Kimber trans. 1980).
29.

REPUBLIC

AMERICAN
AMERICAN

30. This was attributable, at least in part, to the broader diffusion of property in the United
States than Britain. See, e.g., J. POLE, supra note 29, at 205-06.
31. See generally Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
32. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 9, at 57 (J. Madison).
33. Id. at 61-62.
34. See, e.g., Rousseau, Considerations on the Government of Poland, in ROUSSEAU: POLITICAL
WRITINGS 162-67 (F. Watkins trans. 1953).
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Separated from the rest of mankind, they lived together, destitute of all business,
pleasure, and amusement, but war and politics, pride and ambition; . . . as if fighting
and intriguing, and not life and happiness, were the end of man and society; as if the
love of one's country and of glory were amiable passions, when not limited by justice
and general benevolence 3. 5 . . . Human nature perished under this frigid system of
national and family pride.

The Founders thus perceived the perfectionism of classical republicanism as
the key to the concept's political vices because they interpreted its parochial
insularity as inconsistent with the fundamental values of their own republican
project, namely, respect for rights and pursuit of the public good. For this
reason, Madison, like Adams, argued that a well-designed constitutional
democracy should achieve its ultimate ends without requiring all of its citizens
36
to display the heroic virtues of classical republicanism.
What, for the American Founders, were the ultimate ends of governance,
and why were the theory and practice of classical republicanism inconsistent
with the achievement of these ends? As we have seen, the Founders rejected
vaious aspects of classical republicanism (ethical perfectionism, mass
assemblies, rights of voting and participation as ultimate ends), because they
regarded them as inconsistent with the ultimate ends of republican
constitutionalism. The crucial point is that the Founders understood the
purpose of their constructivist project to be the protection of the inalienable
rights of the person. These are the rights that persons cannot surrender to
the state and are rights against which the legitimacy of state power must
accordingly be tested. The idea of such rights-so foreign to classical political
theory-centered on concepts such as the inalienable right to conscience, the

right of each person as a democratic equal to form, express, and revise
personal ethical theories as an expression of his practical rationality and
reasonableness.

37

III
LIBERALISM AND RESPECT FOR RIGHTS

When the British philosopher, Richard Price, wrote in defense of the
American
Revolution
and
the emerging
pattern of American
38
constitutionalism,
he identified four principal liberties for which the
Americans fought: physical, moral, religious, and civil. He defined and
explicated these liberties in the following striking terms:
By PHYSICAL LIBERTY I mean that principle of Spontaneity, or Self-determzination,

which constitutes us Agents; or which gives us a command over our actions, rendering
35.
36.
37.

See C. ADAMS, supra note 9, at 554.
See generally A. LOVEJOY, REFLECTIONS ON HUMAN NATURE (1961).
See, e.g., D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION, supra note 6, at 85-102.

38. Pertinent texts include R. PRICE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE OF CIVIL LIBERTY, THE
PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT, AND TIlE JUSTICE AND POLICY OF THE WAR WITH AMERICA (1776); R.
PRICE, ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE AND VALUE OF CIVIL LIBERTY, AND THE WAR WITH

R. PRICE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1785).
Both OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE OF CIVIL LIBERTY and ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS are reprinted
in R. PRICE, Two TRACTS ON CIVIL LIBERTY THE WAR WITH AMERICA AND FINANCES OF THE KINGDOM
(Da Capo Press ed. 1972) [hereinafter R. PRICE, Two TRACTS].
AMERICA (1777);
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them properly ours, and not effects of the operation of any foreign cause.-MORAL
LIBERTY is the power of following, in all circumstances, our sense of right and
wrong; or of acting in conformity to our reflecting and moral principles, without being
controuled by any contrary principles.-RELIGIOUS LIBERTY signifies the power of
exercising, without molestation, that mode of religion which we think best; or of
making the decisions of our own consciences respecting religious truth, the rule of our
conduct, and not any of the decisions of our fellowmen.-In like manner; CIVIL
LIBERTY is the power of a Civil Society or State to govern itself by its own discretion, or
by laws of its own making, without being subject to the impositions of any power, in
appointing and directing which the collective body of the people have no concern, and
over which they have no controul.
It should be observed, that, according to these definitions of the different kinds of
liberty, there is one general9 idea, that runs through them all; I mean, the idea of self3
direction, or self-government.

The point is not that persons are asocial monads who form their identities out
of nothing. Such would be a mistaken reading of liberalism. To the contrary,
Locke, for example, assumed that social institutions, like language, frame the
40
question of how to live, and are presuppositions of the liberal state.
Liberalism arose when the traditional power of certain institutions
(established churches, for example) over crucial areas of personal life was
rejected on the ground of the political principle of liberty of conscience. The
right to conscience, which encompasses Price's moral and religious liberties,
was identified as a central paradigm of inalienable human rights 4 1 because it
protects the natural moral competence of each person, as a democratic equal,
to make reasonable judgments about the basic personal and ethical values
around which he organizes a theory of a well-lived life. This preserves choice
among competing communities of belief. In Price's terms, the right to
conscience secures essential powers of self-government or personal autonomy
because it protects independent judgment in the formation, expression, and
42
revision of basic evaluative beliefs about the value of life.
The point at which liberal political theory departs most radically from
classical republicanism is in its respect for and guarantee of the basic rights of
the person, such as the right to conscience, and also in its preservation of an
individual moral independence-itself often critical of the claims of state
power. Therefore, a critical distance is maintained between state power and
the individual, who is the ultimate repository of moral and political
sovereignty. This is in contrast to classical republicanism and its celebration
of the heroic virtue of service to the state. Skepticism of state power over
questions of conscience first arose with the breakdown of religious and moral
orthodoxy in the Reformation and the widespread literacy made possible by
the printing press. The grounds for that skepticism derived from a larger
39.

R.

40.

See, e.g., J.

PRICE, Two TRACTS,
TULLY,

A

supra note 38, at 3-4.

DISCOURSE ON

PROPERTY:

JOHN LOCKE AND His ADVERSARIES 3-50

(1980).
41. See, e.g., Additional Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty, in R. PRICE, Two TRACTS, Supra
note 38.
42. For a comparable argument that respect for rights secures a sort of sovereignty analogous to
political sovereignty among nations, see J. FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 27-97 (1986).
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skepticism about traditional conceptions of authority in science, religion,
4
ethics, and politics.

3

IV
UiIVERSAL TOLERATION AND LIBERTY NEUTRALITY

When Locke 44 and Bayle 45 stated their pathbreaking arguments for
universal religious toleration (however cramped by contemporary standards
since they excluded Catholics and atheists 4 6 ), they focused on an incoherence
in the traditional Augustinian argument for religious persecution. 4 7 While
Augustine defended respect for the integrated exercise of the rational
capacity, belief, and desire of the human person, he also imputed to any
dissenter from religious orthodoxy an irrational demonic fault in the will that,
like insanity, called not for respect but for coercive intervention to protect
others from injury and the agent from self-injury. 48 The inference is not only
wrong, but viciously circular. Augustine and his epigones49 took conventional
standards of orthodox belief, to which they were committed, as the exclusive
measure of all forms of reasonable belief and, on this ground, imputed to
dissenters a lack of rational capacity of the sort that requires not respect but
intervention. In effect, they read issues of rational and reasonable capacity

through the prism of committed sectarian belief, and thus failed to accord any
fair respect for the exercise of rational and reasonable capacity independent

50
of such sectarian belief.
The analysis of this political pathology in Locke and Bayle is piercing,
focusing as it does on the elaboration of a familiar theme in seventeenthcentury moral thought51 : the ways in which the language of moral virtue was
often a rhetorical mask for entrenched self-interest, sectarian bias, and the
52
manipulative pride of power. Neither Locke nor Bayle was a moral skeptic

43. For a fuller discussion, see D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION, supra note 6, at 67-128, 166-74.
44. See 6J. LOCKE, THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE (11 th ed. 1812) The sixth volume contains four
letters concerning toleration.
45. See P. Bayle, Commentaire Philosophique sur ces paroles de Jesus Christ "Contrain-les dentree", in 2
OEUVRES DIVERSES DE M. PIERRE BAYLE 257-560 (1727) [hereinafter Commentaire Philosophique]. For
an English translation of Bayle's commentary, see P. LANG, PIERRE BAYLE'S PHILOSOPHICAL
COMMENTARY: A MODERN TRANSLATION AND CRITICAL INTERPRETATION (P. Lang trans. 1987).
46. For Locke, see A Letter Concerning Toleration, being a translationof the Epistula de Tolerantia, in 6J.
LOCKE, WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE, supra note 44, at 1, 45-47 [hereinafter A Letter Concerning Toleration].
For Bayle, see P. Bayle, Commentaire Philosophique, supra note 45, at 410-15 (Catholics), 431 (atheists).
47. See, e.g., AUGUSTINE, THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF ST. AUGUSTINE 190-240 (H. Paolucci ed.
1962).
48. See texts cited in AUGUSTINE, THE POLITICAL AND, SOCIAL IDEAS OF ST. AUGUSTINE 205 (H.
Deane ed. 1963), which make this point exactly.
49. See T. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE 89-91 (T. Gilby trans. 1974).
50. For a fuller discussion, see D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION, supra note 6, at 85-98.
51. See generally A. LovEjoY, supra note 36.
52. On Locke, see generallyJ. COLMAN,JOHN LOCKE'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1983); on Bayle, see
E. LABROUSSE, BAYLE 70-71 (D. Potts trans. 1983).
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along the lines of Hobbes 53 and Mandeville, 54 and they therefore did not infer
from such self-righteousness that there were no applicable standards of
ethical justification independent of self-interest. To the contrary, their
argument for universal toleration presumed political conditions that would
allow the development of an ethic of equal respect uncorrupted by the moral
tyranny of sectarian self-righteousness (including, for Locke, the
unconscionable legitimation of political tyranny in the form of absolute
monarchy 55 ).
It is this perspective that explains the American Founders' rejection of
classical republicanism as the operative political psychology of American
constitutionalism. As discussed earlier, from the perspective of American
constitutional thinkers like Madison and Adams, the elitist Aristotelian
perfectionism of classical republicanism was a species of faction, highly insular
and parochial. Thus, in Madison's terms, it was "adverse to the rights of
other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the
community," 5 6 and it often acted, according to Adams, "as if the love of one's
country and of glory were amiable passions, when not limited by justice and
57
general benevolence."
For Madison, as for Adams, the motivating public morality of American
republicanism was an ethic of equal respect, where public power was
harnessed both to insure respect for the inalienable rights of persons and to
pursue the public good. 58 That egalitarian ethic, made possible by respect for
each person's equal liberty of conscience, 59 was, by definition, an ethic whose
demands could be met by and reasonably justified to our common human
nature. 60 That ethic could, therefore, only impose burdens of civil duty that
could be reasonably borne by all persons and justified to them as reasonable
53. See T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 63-84 (M. Oakeshott ed. 1955). For pertinent commmentary, see
D. GAUTHIER, THE LOGIC OF LEVIATHAN 1-26 (1969); G. KAVKA, HOBBESIAN MORAL AND POLITICAL
THEORY 29-82 (1986); L. STRAUSS, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF HOBBES 108-28 (E. Sinclair trans.

1984).
54. See B. MANDEVILLE, THE FABLE OF THE BEES (Phillip Harth ed. 1970). For pertinent
commentary, see M. GOLDSMITH, PRIVATE VICES, PUBLIC BENEFITS: BERNARD MANDEVILLE'S SOCIAL
AND POLITICAL THOUGHT 1-46 (1985).
55. See generallyJ. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (P. Laslett ed. 1960).

56.

THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 9, at 57 (J. Madison).

57. 4 C. ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 9, at 554.
58. For Madison, see TIlE FEDERALIST Nos. 10 & 51, at 56, 347 (J. Cooke ed. 1961); for John
Adams, see 4 C. ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 9, at 318 ("ITihe end of government
is the greatest happiness of the greatest number, saving at the same time the stipulated rights of

all.").
59. Madison makes this point in his Memorial and Remonstrance. See, e.g., THE MIND OF THE
FOUNDER 10-11 (M. Meyers ed. rev. ed. 1981). Jefferson made a similar point in his Billfor Establishing
Religious Freedom, whose enactment Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance defends. See T. JEFFERSON, A
Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1777-1779, at 545 (J.
Boyd ed. 1950). John Adams suggests a not dissimilar link in his A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal
Law, in 3 C. ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 447-64 (1851). For a discussion of the link between
Jefferson's and Madison's theory of anti-establishment and the unleashing of a republican public
morality of equal respect, see generally Richards, Religion, Public Morality, and Constiutional Law, in
NOMOS YEARBOOK ON RELIGION, MORALITY, AND THE LAw 152 (1988).
60. Cf Scanlon, Contractualismand Utilitarianism,in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 103-28 (A. Sen &
B. Williams eds. 1982).
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demands. The perfectionist elitism of classical republicanism imposed selfsacrificing ideals of heroic excellence well beyond what could be reasonably
demanded of all persons, and indeed was blatantly inconsistent with what
Madison and Adams called "human nature." 6' Indeed, from the perspective
of the argument for universal toleration, the enforcement of such
perfectionist ideals by the state would impose a factionalized moral view upon
society that obfuscates the legitimating responsibility of the state to respect
inalienable human rights and to pursue the public good. For example, the
civic virtue of the ancients not only legitimated slavery and the subjugation of
women (in contrast, for example, to the Founders' clear unease with the harsh
political realities that perpetuated slavery in the new republic 62 ), but also,
rampant imperialism for the sole purpose of military adventure and glory. 63
Thus, the civic virtues of classical republicanism were, as both Montesquieu 64
and Hume 65 had recognized, masks for political manipulation and tyranny.
The Founders' skepticism about classical virtue reflected the larger
skepticism of the argument for universal toleration and the egalitarian ethic of
equal respect that it made possible. But, consistent with these skepticisms,
the Founders believed, like Locke and Bayle, in ethically valid principles, and
they perceived their constructivist task in 1787 to be mobilizing human
nature, as they had come to understand it, in the service of such objective
principles of equal justice under law. 6 6 While their fundamental political
theory of legitimacy was, of course, familiarly Lockean, 6 7 their innovativeness
came in the way they constructed political forms (federalism, the separation of
powers, judicial review premised on inalienable rights of the person immune
from political bargaining) that were self-consciously designed to reflect their
serious skepticism about heroic political virtue.
This skepticism took two principal forms: First, the fact that many political
arguments will be motivated by sectarian commitments to a person, group
61. Madison writes: "[W]hat is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human
nature?" THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). John Adams writes of
Sparta: "Human nature perished under this frigid system of national and family pride." 4 C. ADAMS,
THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 9, at 554.
62. See, e.g., Storing, Slavery and the Moral Foundationsof the American Republic, in R. HORWITZ, THE
MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 313-32 (1986). But see Finkelman, Slavery and the
ConstitutionalConvention: Making a Covenant with Death, in R. BEEMAN, S. BOTEIN & E. CARTER, BEYOND

CONFEDERATION 188 (1987).
63. See M. FINLEY, Politics in the Ancient World, in DEMOCRACY ANCIENT AND MODERN, supra note 12,
at 87.
64. T. PANGLE, MONTESQUIEU'S PHILOSOPHY OF LIBERALISM 48-106 (1973);J. SHKLAR, ORDINARY
VICES 33, 196-97 (1984).
65. See, e.g., Moore, Hume's PoliticalScience and the Classical Republican Tradition, 10 CAN. J. POL. SCI.

809 (1977); D. MILLER, PHILOSOPHY AND IDEOLOGY IN HUME'S POLITICAL THOUGHT 121, 150-51
(1981).
66. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10 & 51, at 56, 347 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
67. At the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, a leading Founder, James Wilson, characterized
the provenance of the American theory and practice of constitutional legitimacy in the following
terms: "The great and penetrating mind of Locke seems to be the only one that pointed towards
even the theory of this great truth." See 2 M.JENSEN, supra note 24, at 472. On the Lockean theory of
political legitimacy, see D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION, supra note 6, at 98-102; see generally R. ASHCRAFT,
REVOLUTIONARY POLITICS AND LOCKE'S "Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT" (1986).
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interests, or idea (Madison's Humean theory of faction 6 8 ) makes it impossible
for people to give fair weight to the rights and interests of those outside their
sectarian circle. Second, the fact that aspirations for political power are
primarily motivated by a desire for admiration and reputation (John Adams'
theory of fame 69 ) makes it doubtful that people are actually selflessly acting
for the good of the state. Both of these aspects of political psychology were
assumed by the Founders, and taken seriously as central political motivations
that would have to be channeled in ways more likely to achieve the objective
ends of republican justice. The theory of representation underlying the
federal system, for example, was designed precisely, so Madison argued, 70 to
detoxify faction in the service of republican justice; and the theory of
separation of powers, including an independent and powerful executive, was
used by John Adams in the framing of the Massachusetts Constitution 7 l (a
great influence on the Framers 7 2) as a means of harnessing competition as a
73
prod to republican justice.
Neither Madison nor Adams denied that a sense of justice exists, or that
people often conscientiously act on it, or that such a sense ofjustice must play
an important role both in the people and leadership of constitutional
republicanism. To the contrary, "[r]epublican government presupposes the
existence of these qualities in a higher degree than any other form," 7 4 and
construes its constitutional tasks "to obtain for rulers, men who possess [the]
most wisdom to discern, and [the] most virtue to pursue the common good of
the society; and ... to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them
virtuous."

75

As previously stated, the Founders were not moral skeptics, but

they were skeptics about political psychology, and they perceived their
constitutional task as framing the powers and responsibilities of government
in such a way as to channel the political psychology of faction and competition
in ways likely to support the results that republican justice requires.
Both of these assumptions about political psychology bespeak a skeptical
distrust, consistent with the argument for universal toleration, of the
distortions of moral judgment by political power, whether by economic
interests, sectarian self-righteousness, or willful pride. The lesson to be
68. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 9, at 57 (J. Madison). Madison takes the theory of
faction from the political psychology of David Hume. See D. HUME, Of the First Principles of Government,
in ESSAYS MORAL, POLITICAL AND LITERARY 30 (1963); D. ADAIR, FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS
75-106 (1974).
69. For Adams' most extended philosophical explication of this theory, seeJ. ADAMS Discourses on
Davila, in 6 C. ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 232-81 (1851). See generallyJ. SCHUrz & D. ADAIR,
THE SPUR OF FAME (1980); D. ADAIR, supra note 68, at 20-25.
70. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 9, at 56-65 (J. Madison).
71. For John Adams' work on the framing of the Massachusetts Constitution, see 4 C. ADAMS,
THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 9, at 213-67. For an important political essay supportive of
the theory of constitutionalism that was to flower in Adams' drafting of the Massachusetts

Constitution of 1780, see The Essex Result, in 1 C. HYNEMAN & D. Lurz,
DURING THE FOUNDING ERA 1760-1805, 480-522 (1983).
72.
73.
74.
75.

See, e.g.,
See THE
See THE
See THE

AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING

THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 464 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
FEDERALIST No. 51, at 347-53 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
FEDERALIST No. 56, at 378-83 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
FEDERALIST No. 57, at 384-90 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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learned from a sober reading of political history, including that of classical
republicanism, was-the Founders argued 76-the need to break the easy link
between factionalized moral and political judgment and political power
institutionally. The most substantive and direct constituotional attempt to
break this linkage was the adoption of the first amendment.
The doctrinal point-pervasive both in the law of religious liberty and free
speech-may be put in terms of the argument for universal toleration
discussed earlier, an argument that the protections of the first amendment
self-consciously assume. 7 7 The argument for universal toleration distrusts the
power of the state to make impartial judgments about the scope of reasonable
decisions in the formation, expression, and revision of one's religious
conscience and the moral and political judgments of ultimate value. In
essence, censorious state judgments in this arena rest on the fallacy of the
Augustinian argument for religious persecution: Judgments about the
worthlessness of beliefs, made from the censor's perspective of sectarian
ideological commitments, are fallaciously assumed to justify the inference of
irrationally self-destructive madness and harm to self and others and, on that
ground, of political repression.
The principle of universal toleration was generalized into a constitutional
principle that is a prophylaxis against this fallacy: Namely, judgments of the
state about the unreasonableness of beliefs of conscience or the irrational
worthlessness of speech, precisely because they are not content neutral, 78
cannot justify the abridgement of the liberty to form, express, or revise
conscience. Abridgement of such beliefs or speech cannot be justified on
such essentially sectarian grounds, but only in terms of some conception of
imminent secular harms, the violation of what Locke called "civil interests,"
which he thus defined: "Civil interest I call life, liberty, health, and indolency
of body; and the possession of outward things, such as money, lands, houses,
furniture, and the like."' 79 Secular harms, understood as the violation of such
interests, assume a commonly understood metric of general goods that define
a constitutionally reasonable benchmark of neutrality among the
pluralistically disparate visions of the good life to which reasonable persons
may commit themselves, including their more ultimate religious or
philosophical perspectives. 80 Accordingly, the American constitutional
protections of both conscience and speech forbid any non-neutral censorious
judgments, and allow the state to exert its regulatory power in these areas

76.

See, e.g.,

THE FEDERALIST

No. 10, supra note 9, at 56 (J. Madison);J. Adams, A Defence, in 4 C.

ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 9, at 283-98;J. Adams, Thoughts on Government,
ADAMS, supra note 9, at 193-200.
77. See generally D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION, supra note 6.
78. Cf Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1987).

79.

in 4 C.

J. Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, supra note 46, at 9-10.

80. See Rawls, Social Utility and Primary Goods, in
Williams eds. 1982).
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only to the extent supported by compelling secular state interests, that is, the
8
clear and present danger of secular harms. '
The moral nerve of these constitutional doctrines is protection of
autonomy in a stronger sense than appears elsewhere in the constitutional
design. The point is not merely to insure that an individual has the capacity,
82
liberty, and opportunity to act in a manner consistent with the criminal law,
but to offer protection for the exercise of reasonable judgment independent
of the conventional judgments of reasonableness embodied in law and public
policy. Autonomy, in this sense, protects not the individual's reasonable
capacities to conform to law, but his ability, as an independent person,
reasonably to reflect on the ultimate values of life. 8 3 Autonomy at this

juncture is clearly close to the moral nerve of Kantian constructivist
legislation in the kingdom of ends, for the value in law here protected is
precisely the capacity for moral independence that Kant took to be
84
foundational to the distinctive moral status of persons.
Full autonomy, as a value of the first amendment, does not, however,
require the full Kantian machinery of nomenal and phenomenal worlds and
causal indeterminism. 8 5 The political point is not that moral persons create
themselves ex nihilo, or are independent of all causal law or explanation;
indeed, the Founders assumed just the opposite, an empirically grounded law
of political psychology (for example, the theory of faction). Rather, the point
is that persons not only have a rational capacity to reflect on and order their
own desires and appetites over time and to act on reasons supplied by the
state or conventional authority, but they also possess a higher-order capacity
to reflect on the nature, weight, and authority of such reasons. That each and
every person has this ultimate normative authority is the moral foundation for
the only kind of sovereignty consistent with constitutional liberalism, popular
86
sovereignty.
The value in law of full autonomy is not a metaphysical one, nor does it
arise in a vacuum of atomistically ahistorical self-creation.8 7 Contextually, as
we have seen, full autonomy arose as an important political issue only when
pluralistic moral perspectives became a live issue in the Reformation, when
the traditional role of the state in the enforcement of sectarian value was
subjected to searching criticism for inhibiting the expression of any
81. For fuller discussion of these principles, see D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION, supra note 6, at 178227.
82. See generally H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968).
83. For a general, recent treatment of these values, see L. HAWORTH, AUTONOMY (1986).
84. Kant expressed the relationship between ethical principles and autonomy as the analyticity
of the principle of autonomy in the concept of morality in I. KANT, FOUNDATION OF THE METAPHYSICS
OF

MORALS 59 (L. Beck trans. 1959). Cf Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77J. PHIL. 515

(1980) (reformulation of Kant's conception of sovereignty in the kingdom of ends in terms of respect
for each person's higher-order moral powers of rationality and reasonableness).
85. For pertinent commentary on these aspects of Kant's critical philosophy, see generally S.
KORNER, KANT (1955).
86. See D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION, supra note 6, at 38-41, 98-102. Cf J. Wilson, Lectures on Law,
in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 168-96 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967).
87.

See generally Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, supra note 84.
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philosophical view that was contrary to sectarian orthodoxy. 88 The point is
not that sectarian orthodoxy was irrational or even non-rational (often it
contained deep wisdom), but that it undermined its own intellectual integrity
by shutting out alternative viewpoints.
It is no philosophical accident that Locke framed the argument for
universal toleration in terms of constraints on enforceable public morality.
The public morality enforceable through the criminal law must, in this view,
be limited to the minimal standards of protection that can be reasonably
enforced on persons with incommensurably diverse ultimate theories of value
in living a good and ethical life. Correlatively, Locke makes the point, as did
Jefferson,8 9 expressly in the terms of the harm principle. The state may not,
for example, forbid killing a calf (in contrast to a child) in one's religious
rituals, "for no injury is thereby done to anyone, no prejudice to another
man's goods." 9 0 John Stuart Mill's later articulation of the harm principle
depends for its force not on doctrinal utilitarianism (as Mill believed), but on
this argument, which is, as has been suggested, best understood in Kantian
terms. From the Kantian perspective, the scope of enforceable public
morality cannot extend to conduct whose condemnation rests on sectarian
grounds not reasonably justifiable in terms of the protection of general
goods. 9 1
V
SPHERES OF PRIVACY AND THE HARM PRINCIPLE

The constitutional guarantees of full autonomy were thus directed at a
concrete historical problem, namely, the degree to which the state's
enforcement of sectarian values had compromised the practical ethics of equal
respect required for republican constitutionalism. Such constitutionalism
rejected the elitist perfectionism of classical republicanism precisely because
the latter's factionalized insularity failed to acknowledge, let alone take
seriously, the inalienable rights that Richard Price correctly understood to be
motivated by values of self-government fundamental to the American
revolutionary and constitutional enterprise of republican government. The
guarantees of the first amendment protect persons from the enforcement of
factionalized conceptions of conscience and speech. This protection is
necessary to prevent the infringement of the liberties of conscience and
speech, which are basic to the notion that individuals are self-governing moral
and political agents. This makes possible respect for individual rights that are
the essence of republican constitutionalism.
88. See id. at 515.
89. Jefferson observes: "The legitimate powers of government extend to such acts only as are
injurious to others. But it does no injury for my neighbor to say there are twenty gods, or no god. It
neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg." T.JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 159 (W.
Peden ed. 1955).
90.

J. LOCKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration, supra note 46.

91. For further defense of this position, see generally Richards, Kantian Ethics and the Harm
Principle: A Reply to John Finnis, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1987).

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 51 : No. I

Self-government is not, in this sense, autarkic. Persons govern their lives
by standards they take and adapt from the available public culture, and often
do so as members of sub-communities of the larger culture, cultivating and
elaborating distinctive values within their sub-community in contrast to
alternative values available in other sub-communities of the larger society.
Full autonomy as a basic value in self-government assumes these facts, and
remits to each person, rather than to the state, the ultimate choice as to which
standards best embody his values.
Persons under such a constitutional regime of full autonomy have
responsibility for defining their goals; indeed, it is that responsibility, more
than any other, that makes them self-governing agents. The resulting
conception of constitutional government thus views voting rights and
participation not as ends in themselves, but as instrumental to a larger
conception of self-government that is not exclusively or even primarily
political in nature.
Now we can see why liberal constitutional democracy incorporates as its
basis a conception of self-government quite foreign to classical republicanism.
In the classical republican tradition, Pericles denied that anyone could have
any business outside politics. Liberalism, in contrast, does not regard
democratic politics as the only forum for self-government, but as one of many
forums whose legitimacy depends on appropriate respect for the integrity of
other spheres of self-government through which people express their nature
as self-governing moral agents in all aspects of life. Such spheres of selfgovernment are private in the sense that they enjoy, within limits, immunity
from state power. The immunity of conscience and speech from state
censorious judgments required by the principles of the first amendment is one
example. 92 Such spheres of self-government enable persons to take
responsibility for those spheres of activity classically defined as inalienable
rights of the person. These are the rights that cannot justly be surrendered to
any state and against which the legitimacy of state power must accordingly be
93
tested. State power that abridges these rights is, by definition, illegitimate.
The constructivist problem of liberal constitutionalism was to design a
constitutional system that, on the one hand, immunized these spheres of selfgovernment from political bargaining and, on the other hand, mobilized the
power of the state to pursue the public good in those areas justly surrendered
94
to the state.
92. These various senses of "privacy" at stake are explored in D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION, supra
note 6, at 242-44.
93. See id. at 67-102.
94. Arguments of principle and arguments of policy roughly capture the distinction that the
Founders contemplated and that the interpretation of the constitutional system clearly contemplates
(for example, the arguments of principle central to the first amendment and the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment versus the arguments or policy, characteristic of debates over
federalism). That arguments over the scope of federal power would be arguments of policy, best
addressed to legislative discretion, was the clear view of several leading Founders, most notably
James Wilson. Wilson distinguished, both at the Constitutional Convention and the Pennsylvania
ratifying convention, civil liberty from federal liberty. See, e.g., 1 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE
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Because this conception of voting rights and participation is in service of
this more structurally complex conception of legitimate government, voting
rights occupy a different moral space in liberal constitutionalism than they did
in classical republicanism. Voting rights, for example, were thought of by the
Founders as an instrumental means to ensure that the state respects
inalienable rights and pursues the public good. Voting rights were therefore
so structured and distributed to pursue these ends. 9 5 The politics of mass
participation of classical republicanism so flouted inalienable rights that
Madison identified "the true distinction between [classical republican
governments] and the American Governments" 96 as being the latter's
repudiation of a participatory politics that would unleash what Alexander
97
Hamilton called the "demon of faction."
Because voting rights do not properly extend to the abridgement of
inalienable rights, it is equally consistent with the liberal conception of voting
rights that the scope of democratic political bargaining should not be
extended to this sphere. The extraordinary vitality of judicial review in the
United States today depends on these distinctive normative commitments of
liberal constitutionalism. The central role of the judiciary today is largely that
of monitoring the scope of political bargaining to ensure that inalienable
98
rights are not infringed.
This latter conception explains the derivation and elaboration in American
constitutional law of the much controverted constitutional right to privacy. 9 9
This right focuses on the interpretive elaboration and vindication in
contemporary circumstances of an inalienable right of the person explicitly
assumed by the Founders, namely, the right of intimate association, of which
marriage was the paradigm in 1791.100 Various clauses of the Constitution,
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 166 (1911); 2 M. JENSEN, supra note 24, at 346-47. Civil liberties

included many of the rights guaranteed by state bills of rights and, as such, subject to arguments of
principle. But federal liberties identified the public policy purposes of government granted to the
federal government because state regulation thereof-though affecting other states-had neither
effectively realized their benefits, nor fairly distributed their benefits and burdens. The scope and
distribution of such federal liberties were, Wilson argued, a highly discretionary judgment of policy
remitted under the Constitution to the judgment of a representative Congress. The distinction
between arguments of principle and policy is a prominent feature of the jurisprudence of Ronald
Dworkin. See generally R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF
PRINCIPLE (1985); R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).

95.
96.
97.

Madison argues to this effect in THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 9, at 56 (J. Madison).
See THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 428 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
See THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 444 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).

98.

See D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION, supra note 6, at 290-92.

99. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (the right to purchase
contraceptives protected); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (right to an abortion protected);
Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2843 (1986) (consensual homosexual behavior unprotected).
These cases trace the development of the constitutional right to privacy over the last 22 years. They
were not uncontroversial. For the controversy over Roe, see generally Ely, The W'ages of Crying W0f" A
Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1974). For controversy over Bowers, see generally
Richards, ConstitutionalLegitimacy and Constitutional Privacy, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV., 800 (1986).

100. The Founders assumed that inalienable human rights included what Hutcheson called "the
natural right each one has to enter into the matrimonial relation with anyone who consents." F.
HUTCHESON, A SYSTEM OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 299 (P. McReynolds ed. 1969).

Indeed, relevant

historical materials suggest that the right may be more abstractly stated. For example, John
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including the ninth amendment, assume that unenumerated basic human
rights will be enforced on a par with enumerated rights.' 0 ' The right of
intimate association counts as one such unenumerated right, because intimate
personal life is one of the spheres of self-government, like conscience and
speech, that republican principles reserve from state power. 0 2 Republican
constitutionalism envisions intimate personal life as a sphere of selfgovernment on a par with conscience and speech precisely because the
choices of personal life, like those of conscience and speech, engage both the
head and heart in a way essential to the independent exercise of our moral
powers. They identify the communities, or the need to construct
communities, through which free persons may define and implement a life
03
that engages their ultimate personal and ethical values.
Republican constitutionalism thus assumes that choices of personal life
occupy the same moral space of sovereign independence from state power as
do choices of conscience and speech, because the independence of all these
choices preserves the equal moral sovereignty of each and every person
subject to state power that alone legitimates the power of the state.10 4 The
Founders rejected the ethical perfectionism of classical republicanism because
it imposed factionalized values that flouted the respect for rights and the
public good fundamental to republican legitimacy and debased the
competence of persons to make judgments about their personal values. The
Witherspoon, whose lectures Madison attended at Princeton, followed Hutcheson in listing as a basic
human and natural right a "right to associate, if he so incline, with any person or persons, whom he
can persuade (not force)-under this is contained the right to marriage." J. WITHERSPOON, LECTURES
ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY 123 (J. Scott ed.
1982). Accordingly, Oliver Ellsworth, a leading
commentator writing in support of the ratification of the Constitution, rebutted the anti-federalist
argument that the 1787 Constitution failed to explictly protect the liberty of the press by noting that
this right, like many other fundamental rights (including the right to marry) was clearly reserved from
state power: "Nor is liberty of conscience, or of matrimony, or of burial of the dead; it is enough that
congress have no power to prohibit either, and can have no temptation." 0. ELLSWORTH, A
LANDHOLDER VI, reprinted in 14 J. KAMINSKI & G. SALADINO, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTrruTION 401 (1976). Earlier, Ellsworth wrote of "a matter more sacred
than all the property in the world, the disposal of children." Id. at 141. Similarly, leading statesmen
at the state conventions ratifying the Constitution, both for and against adoption, assumed that the
Constitution could not interfere in the domestic sphere. Thus, Alexander Hamilton denied that
federal power does or could "penetrate the recesses of domestic life, and control, in all respects, the

private conduct of individuals." 2 J.

ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS

268

(1836). Patrick Henry of Virginia spoke of the core of our rights to liberty as the sphere where a
person "enjoys the fruits of his labor, under his own fig-tree, with his wife and children around him,
in peace and security." 3 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS 54 (1836). It is
striking that the rhetoric of reserved rights both of leading proponents (Hamilton) and opponents
(Henry) of adoption of the Constitution converged on the private sphere of domestic life.
101. John Hart Ely, for example, concedes that much of the text of the Constitution itself
contemplated the inference of fundamental rights not specified in the Bill of Rights, for example, the
privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment, adapted from the comparable clause
in Article IV. SeeJ. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 22-30 (1980).
102. For a general defense of the right to intimate association as an unenumerated right
protected by American constitutional tradition, see generally Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association,
89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980).
103. See D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION, supra note 6, at 242-54.
104. See id at 39-41, 98-102. For an exploration of the various senses of "privacy" at stake here,
see id. at 242-44.

Page 123: Winter 1988]

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY

constitutional doctrines of both religious liberty and free speech have
elaborated upon this theme in their rejection of the censorship of either
conscience or speech on grounds that reflect sectarian values. The protection
of the right to privacy calls for no less. Otherwise, the right to privacy will be
trivialized and regulated according to the lowest common denominator of
05
majoritarian taste. 1
Accordingly, coercive constraints on the exercise of the right to privacy
have become constitutionally suspect when, in contemporary circumstances,
they can no longer be justified to society in the non-sectarian terms that
constitutional principles require. Prohibition of the sale and use of
contraceptives clearly cannot be justified in the required way, and it is
therefore natural that the constitutional right to privacy was first elaborated to
06
strike down such laws.1

Later elaborations of the constitutional right to privacy, such as its
expansion to cover abortion and its failure to cover consensual adult
homosexual behavior,' 0 7 are much more controversial.10 8 This author
certainly will not defend all the work of the Supreme Court in this area, in
particular, the Court's ill-considered and incoherent refusal to extend
constitutional protection to consensual adult homosexual behavior.' 0 9 But
the constitutional right to privacy is clearly a correct attempt to protect the
sphere of moral self-government surrounding intimate personal life from the
tyrannies of majoritarian values.
In the context of this argument, the harm principle derives not from
utilitarianism, but from a rights-based conception of the essential spheres of
self-governing moral independence. It is therefore, in principle, wholly
irrelevant how widespread sectarian perspectives on the worth of conscience,
speech, or lifestyle might be, or how much the pleasure of majoritarian
solidarity about such perspectives might, on utilitarian grounds, outweigh the
pains of despised outcasts from such perspectives. The harm principle does
not occupy the moral space subject to such utilitarian aggregation and the
political bargaining that is its vehicle, and thus Mill was correct, albeit not on
utilitarian grounds, to insist:
If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the
contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person,
than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind.' 1' 0

The point is that no teleological political theory can plausibly explain without
circularity the power of Mill's intuitions or the principles of American
constitutional law that support them.
For further amplification, see id. at 231-54.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965). For further discussion, see D. RICHARDS,
TOLERATION, supra note 6, at 256-61.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2843 (1986).
See generally Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy and Constitutional Privacy, supra note 99.
Mill, On Liberty, supra note 4, at 204.
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This author has therefore developed an alternative political theory, and
shown how that theory emerges quite naturally as the best interpretation of
the American constitutional tradition. That theory is, of course,
deontological, in the sense that the relevant principles of political right (like
equal liberty of conscience, or speech, or association) are not understood as
justified by teleological aggregation in any sense, but as principles that enjoy,
within the scope of their application, priority over aggregative considerations.
Put bluntly, the strength of these principles is shown by the fact that they
often apply even when aggregative arguments (for example, the pleasure of
social solidarity) would require the contrary. Such arguments are usually
expressed in American constitutional law as arguments framed as basic rights,
and rights are, at least for Americans, trumps over majoritarian political
bargaining. ''' That practice is, as has been suggested, best interpreted in the
terms of a deontological political theory of a Kantian sort, namely, that
American constitutionalism is a constructivist exercise in liberal political
theory, in which the state's legitimacy depends, inter alia, on its respect for
equal liberties like conscience, speech, and association that enable people to
retain their status as self-governing moral agents to whom the state is
accountable.
The harm principle, thus understood, is a requirement that the
abridgement of these liberties can only be justified in terms of a background
theory ofjustice and a showing of compelling secular interests not themselves
hostage to a factionalized perspective on human values. The proper
interpretation of this requirement is often controversial, for people who fully
accept its normative force may differ over how it applies in a particular case,
notably, abortion. 11 2 Furthermore, society's sense of whether or not the
burden of justification is even in issue, let alone met, is contextually sensitive
to changing understandings of background issues of fact and social and
economic factors, including demographic shifts due to changing rates in
mortality and morbidity in response to public health measures. The role of
children in marriage and the family, for example, obviously changed due
to the shift from a largely agrarian to an industrial society against a
background of declining adult and infant mortality rates. Children play less of
an economic role in an industrial society than they previously played on the
farm, and having large numbers of them is less sensible when one knows that
most will live to adulthood. Strong political requirements, supportive of
having many children and even having children at all, might in the earlier
period have appeared so clearly justified that no objection to them was
plausible, since having many children served imperative economic necessities.
In the later period, such requirements (for example, anti-contraception and
111. See, e.g., D. DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 94, at 92, 102, 139, 146, 169,
177, 191, 199, 269.
112. For the view that the prohibition of abortion satisfies this neutrality demand, see
Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Lawmaking, 84 MICH. L. REv. 352, 371 (1985). For the view that
it does not, see D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION, supra note 6, at 261-69.
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anti-homosexuality laws) can no longer be justified because they aggravate the
problems of overpopulation." 3 Accordingly, the constitutional right to
privacy is naturally brought into play to question such laws 1 14 in a way that
would, in previous circumstances, have been unthinkable. Indeed, the very
conception of rights and responsibilities in family life undergoes changes
responsive to such shifts, as many traditional conceptions are subject to
reassessment in terms of their continuing neutrality, 1 5 including, of course,
their consistency with emerging constitutional principles of gender
equality.' 16
In one respect, the theory of the harm principle, proposed here, is less
t7
expansive than the form of the principle associated with John Stuart Mill."

For Mill, all forms of criminalization must be assessed in terms of this
principle; the author's proposal limits the force of the principle to cases where
the state abridges certain basic rights of the person, to wit, rights of
conscience, speech, and association.
It is, of course, often a matter of some controversy as to how far the
conception of basic rights should be extended and thus the corresponding
scope of the application of the harm principle. American constitutional law
has shown little tendency, for example, to extend such protection to
commercial sex or most forms of drug use, 118 although arguments to this
effect are by no means frivolous."t 9 If such conduct is not within the scope of
a constitutionally protected right to privacy, presumably laws criminalizing
such conduct should be subject to a less demanding burden of justification
than the harm principle. Nonetheless, many such laws still may be subject to
cogent criticism on the ground that they cause more social evil and injustice
0
than they remedy.12

113.

On the force of these arguments in shaping a new political consensus, see generally J. REED,

THE BIRTH CONTROL MOVEMENT AND AMERICAN SOCIETY: FROM PRIVATE VICE TO PUBLIC VIRTURE

(1978).
114.

See

D.

RICHARDS,

TOLERATION,

supra note

6,

at

256-61

(contraception),

269-80

(homosexuality).
115. Cf Schneider, State-Interest Analysis in Fourteenth-Amendment -Privacy" Law. An Essay on the
Constitutionalizationof Social Issues, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1988, at 79, 97-118 (whose critical
views about the current understanding of state-interest analysis reflect many of these concerns).
116. For a discussion of the changing modern constitutional doctrine of sexual equality, see
generally Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution. 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984).
117. See generally J. MILL, On Liberty, supra note 4.
118. But see Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 511 (Alaska 1975) (the use of small amounts of
marijuana by adults in the home is protected by Alaska Constitution); People v. Woody, 61 Cal.2d
716, 719-28, 394 P.2d, 813, 814-16, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 72-74 (1964) (ban on the drug peyote
unconstitutional as applied to use in bona fide religious practices by the Native American Church).
119. See D. RICHARDS, SEX, DRUGS, DEATH, supra note 6, at 84-153 (commercial sex), 157-212
(drug use).
120. See id. Heroin may be a special case. -See generally J. KAPLAN, ThE HARDEST DRUG (1983) (on
the difficulty of using any method short of prohibitionist policy to control heroin). But cf A.
TREBACH, THE HEROIN SOLUTION

heroin defended).

(1982) (regulatory, not prohibitionist, alternatives for control of
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VI
AGAINST PERFECTIONIST THEORIES OF VIRTUE AND VICE

The sphere of morally independent self-government is often at peril when

popular moral objections to an action or way of life take the form of
perfectionist argument. Arguably, a woman should not have an abortion,
although carrying the child to term inflicts substantial personal and
psychological costs on the woman, because the perfectionist ideal of selfsacrificing maternity is denigrated by abortions. 12 1 Similarly, it might be
argued that a homosexual should have no personal sexual life because that
lifestyle flouts the ideal of traditional family life.' 2 2 As arguments for
criminalization, such perfectionist arguments cannot be reasonably justified to
the community at large, for arguments of this sort impose unreasonable
the grounds of sectarian
sacrifices of well-being and personal happiness 1on
2
perceptions that many reasonable people reject. 3
Consider-as a useful case study of the political implications of a selfconsciously articulated perfectionist moral theory-John Finnis' moral
condemnation of contraceptives and homosexuality.' 2 4 The motivating idea
in his condemnation of contraceptives is that their use insults the value of life
(a child is not conceived) and the value of marital sexual friendship. But
neither claim is clearly true, let alone reasonable. On what ground is
contraception analogized to murder 2 5 or to the mutilation of sexual love?
Finnis' latter contention rests on a certain conception of the love of God, but
there are many ways to view the value of sexual love and its relation to divine
love, and many people are likely to find Finnis' diatribes of self-mutilation
quite unbelievable and certainly not properly enforceable. For many persons,
emancipated from traditional conceptions of mandatory gender and
procreational roles, it is simply not unreasonable to believe, and act on the
belief, that contraception not only violates no religious or moral duty, but
makes possible the construction of new perspectives on the marital
relationship-ones in which their sexual, personal, and ethical aims may be
pursued on fairer terms than those allowed by the traditional marital
relationship. 12 6 The use of contraceptives does not degrade, nor does it
mutilate; to the contrary, it has made it possible for women and men to make
121. See, e.g., K. LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 126-57 (1984).
122. Seegenerally R. MAGNUSON, ARE GAY RIGHTS RIGHTS? (1985).
123. See D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION, supra note 6, at 261, 280.
124. See Finnis, PersonalIntegrity, Sexual Morality, and Responsible Parenthood, I ANTHROPOS: RIViSTA
DI STUDI SUL[A PERSONA DE LA FAMILIA 43, 48-49, 52-54 (1985). See generally Finnis, Legal Enforcement
of "Duties to Oneself': Kant v. Neo-Kantians, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 433 (1987) (homosexuality). Finnis'
views are explored at greater length in Richards, Kantian Ethics and the Harm Principle. A Reply to John
Finnis, supra note 91.
125. Of the emission of semen apart from procreation in marriage, Thomas Aquinas wrote:
"[Aifter the sin of homicide whereby a human nature already in existence is destroyed, this type of
sin appears to take next place, for by it the generation of human nature is precluded." T. AQUINAS,
ON THE TRUTH OF THE CATHOLIC FAITH: SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES 146 (V. Bourke trans. 1956).
126. See generally J. REED, supra note 113.
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moral judgments in defining fairer and more humane perspectives of the
marital relationship.
Finnis' condemnation of consensual adult homosexual relations is no less
unreasonable as a basis for criminalization than his condemnation of
contraceptives. His picture of homosexuality as "the eighties gaybar/bathhouse, in which lust courts even homicide and self-destruction"'' 2 7 is
an uninformed stereotype of Manichean evil. This picture distorts the
128
enormous range and diversity of relationships among homosexuals today.
It falsely reduces all such relationships to one stereotype and even this
stereotype is itself stereotypically shaped by the factionalized moral hatred
that Finnis exemplifies which drives some homosexuals into anonymous and
secretive encounters, the only lifestyle that can survive such hatred.' 29 The
injustice of Finnis' characterization of homosexuality is manifest in the way he
makes oblique reference to the AIDS health crisis. He suggests that the
tragedy was self-willed when in fact the disease developed long before the
relevant subclass of homosexual men knew or had reason to know that certain
forms of homosexual relations led to the spread of the disease and thus before
they could take reasonable preventive steps.' 30 He also fails to take seriously
the role of criminalization and moral stigma in increasing health risks.131 But
Finnis is not concerned with making elementary distinctions or just
observations about the diversities of homosexual life, or even to get the facts
straight about this tragedy without villains. Rather, he frames moral
assessment in the terms best designed to fit his inflexible stereotypes, thus
indulging ignorance and intolerance, blaming the victim in a way that
gratuitously insults moral innocence.
Finnis' picture of the vice of homosexuality should be compared with his
contrasting picture of virtue: the traditional marriage relationship without
use of contraceptives or abortion services, in which sexuality, friendship, and
caring are wedded into a harmonious whole. That idealized picture is the sort
132
of perfectionist value that Finnis believes fundamental to ethical reasoning,
but Finnis' interpretation of his general goods shows the grave internal flaws
127.

Finnis, Legal Enforcement of "Duties to Oneself " supra note 124, at 445.

128. See generally A. BELL & M. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALITIES: A STUDY OF DIVERSITY AMONG MEN
AND WOMEN (1978) [hereinafter HOMOSEXUALITIES]; A. BELL, M. WEINBERG & S. HAMMERSMITH,
SEXUAL PREFERENCE: ITS DEVELOPMENT IN MEN AND WOMEN 193-211 (1981); P. BLUMSTEIN & P.
SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES 319-24 (1983); W. MASTERS & V. JOHNSON, HOMOSEXUALITY IN
PERSPECTIVE 226-31, 403-11 (1979).
129. See, e.g., A. BELL & M. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALITIES, supra note 128, at 81-102; M. HOFFMAN,

THE GAY WORLD 164-77 (1968); L. HUMPHREYS, TEAROOM TRADE 1-15 (1970).
130.

(1986).

See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, MOBILIZING AGAINST AIDS 2

Indeed, once the nature of the transmission of the disease became widely known,

homosexual men changed their sexual activities. Id. at 90-93.

131. See Note, The Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REV.
1613, 1632-33 (1974). Criminalization and larger patterns of discrimination also render difficult the
formation of the kinds of stable relationships which could both minimize health risks and humanely
deal with health problems when they occur. See Mohr, AIDS, Gay Life, State Coercion, 6 RARITAN 38
(1986).
132. See generally J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980); J. FINNIS, FUNDAMENTALS
OF ETHICS (1983).
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of this picture as a standard for the enforcement of law. Finnis interprets that
idealized picture in a way that many would reasonably reject as a stereotypical
distortion. He imputes to marital relationships a certain kind of virtue that
they often lack, and parodies any form of non-marital intimate relationship
(including homosexual relationships) as lacking a virtue which they often
have.
Consider a homosexual couple whose relationship endures over many
years. All of the elements that Finnis attributes to conventional marriage may
flourish there: sexual transcendence, intimate friendship, understanding and
mutual support, caring for one another, and the range of interests that such a
relationship fructifies. It is false to claim that such relationships are internally
flawed and it distorts reality to fail to mark the genuine moral continuities in
the virtues of personal relationships conventionally marital and
33
unconventionally non-marital.
How is this kind of self-willed moral blindness to be understood? The
answer lies in two distinct strands of such perfectionist thought: the exoteric
strand that writes for a broad secular academic audience' 34 and the esoteric
strand that writes for a narrow audience.13 5 The exoteric writings emphasize
highly abstract general goods that might appeal to reasonable people from
diverse religious and philosophical backgrounds. 36 In contrast, the esoteric
writings elaborate a sectarian interpretation of how these goods are
37
understood and weighed.'
The esoteric writings lack the reasonable tone and appeal of the exoteric
writings in large part because they are more rigid and forthright about the full
range of Finnis' concept of "mutilated sexual activity."' 38 These esoteric
writings are, even on their own sectarian terms, remarkably free of any close
attention to history, to facts, or to ethically sensitive concern for persons as
individuals. This can be seen by comparing Finnis' arguments to those of his
coreligionists who take objection on such grounds to the traditional religious
condemnation of both contraception 3 9 and consensual homosexual
behavior."40 From this perspective, Finnis' appeal to self-evidence will appear
reasonable only to the astigmatism of a now embattled conception of
traditional sectarian commitments, concerned to hold its ground against
133.
134.
135.

136.
137.

See generally P. BLUMSTEIN & P. SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES, supra note 128.
See generally J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW, supra note 132.
See generally Finnis Personal Integrity Sexual Morality, and Responsible Parenthood,supra note 124.
See generally J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW supra note 132.

This includes a defense of Papal writings on the moral theology of permissible birth control.

See Finnis, PersonalIntegrity Sexual Morality, and Responsible Parenthood,supra note 124, at 48-49.

138. See id. at 54. Finnis thus condemns masturbation, id. at 43, 46-47; adultery. id. at 47;
fornication, id.; contraceptive use, id. at 48-49, 52-54; consensual adult homosexual relations, id. at
47. Additonally, Finnis condemns abortion, J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW, supra note 132, at 117; drug
addition, id. at 222; and voluntary decisions to die, id.at 110.
139. See, e.g., J. NOONAN, CONTRACEPTION: A HISTORY OF ITS TREATMENT BY THE CATHOLIC
THEOLOGIANS AND CANONISTS

140.

See generally J.

(1965).

BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY,

MCNEILL, THE CHURCH AND THE HOMOSEXUAL

CHRISTIAN TRADITION (1955).

SOCIAL TOLERANCE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY

(1976); D.

(1980); J.

BAILEY, HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE WESTERN
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subversive critical assessment from within. If such critical assessment leads
other coreligionists to question and reject this "common sense," surely the
community at large cannot justly be kept hostage to such views as the measure
of coercive enforcement of public morality. Such theological views-however
conscientiously held-cannot claim any larger political legitimacy as the just
14 1
measure of criminal law in a liberal state.
Finnis presumably sees the exoteric and esoteric writings as forming a
reasonable unity, but he strategically shapes his exoteric writing so as not to
emphasize the full range of his moral commitments. 14 2 His exoteric strategy
is to appeal to the traditional moral common sense of the community at large
in areas in which he believes it is still open to reason; lost causes, like
contraception and divorce, are thus not addressed. But Finnis' arguments
must be viewed seriously as claims of principle, not as disingenuous political
advocacy, for otherwise it will only be the political popularity of contraception
and unpopularity of homosexuality that will decide these issues. Finnis'
normative arguments rest on a form of perfectionism that. many people in
society at large reasonably reject because they regard Finnis' moral
excellences as an unreasonably restrictive conception of acceptable human
values. It is precisely because perfectionist theories of virtue and vice of this
sort cannot reasonably be enforced on society at large that, as a matter of
principle, liberal societies can no more justly criminalize consensual
homosexual behavior than they can contraception.
Our examination of Finnis' perfectionism should give us pause regarding
the revival of interest in perfectionist moral theories of virtue and vice along
Aristotelian lines.14 3 These theories are often riot transparently motivated, in
the way Finnis' theory is, by a sectarian agenda, and some of them so
conceptualize full autonomy as the most important attribute of character that
14 4
they reach conclusions often convergent with an autonomy-based ethics.
But these theories are pervasively subject to the manipulative political use to
141. See generally Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 391
(1963) (Laws prohibiting consensual adult use of obscene materials and consensual adult
homosexuality, having a solely sectarian religious basis in contemporary circumstances, violate the
anti-establishment clause of the first amendment.).
142. For example, in his article Legal Enforcement of "Duties of Oneself", supra note 124, Finnis
deemphasizes his moral condemnation of contraception.
143. See, e.g., V. HAKSAR, EQUALITY, LIBERTY, AND PERFECTIONISM supra note 23; A. MACINTYRE,
supra note 8; B. WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY (1985); J. RAZ, supra note 23.
144. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 143. Nonetheless, objection may be taken to such views on
Kantian grounds. Kantian autonomy is a higher-order appeal to practical reason and to the highly
abstract goods and resources consistent with this conception. It thus tries to avoid the controversial
and often highly intuitionistic kinds and weights of goods to which perfectionists tend to appeal. See
generally Rawls, Social Unity and PTrimary Goods, supra note 80. Kant's autonomy-based ethics does not,
in contrast to perfectionism, regard autonomy as one perfectionist value among others, all of which
must be consequentially maximized, but interprets equal respect for autonomy as the core of ethical
thinking and interprets and weighs other goods by reference to it. The systematic structure of
Kantian moral theory thus removes the intuitionistic interpretation and weighing of various
excellences on which perfectionism depends. Even as moderate and balanced a perfectionist as
Joseph Raz (see supra note 23) presents highly intuitionistic conceptions of excellences and their
relative weights in a way that undermines the force of his broadly liberal conclusions.
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which Finnis puts them: the question-begging enlistment of the rhetoric of
vice in the service of a now embattled conception of traditional morality.
There is good reason for us to be constitutionally suspicious of arguments
for the legal enforcement of many forms of such perfectionism on the same
ground that the Founders were suspicious. Such arguments are often fueled
by factionalized conceptions of virtue and vice not reasonably justifiable to all
persons as universally applicable and enforceable moral standards. Indeed,
such factionalized perceptions blind people to the requirements of republican
legitimacy, namely, that the state respect rights and pursue the public good.
It was for this reason that the Founders, like Madison and Adams, were quite
willing to find constitutional virtues where the classical republican tradition
found only vice, and vice where it found virtue.
For example, for the Founders, the American absorption in commercial
interests was not a republican vice, as it was for classical republican thought.
Montesquieu and Hume had sharply contrasted the malign insularity and
thirst for glory of the participatory republic of civic virtue 4 5 with the way that
commercial life and exchange under constitutional monarchies like Britain
created incentives to peace and broader ties of reciprocal mutual cooperation
among diverse peoples. 14 6 Madison interpreted these views as arguments that
an appropriately designed national framework of commercial exchange is
essential to a civilized polity and conjoined them to the distinctively American
(and Lockean) theme that one of the core rights to be reserved from state
power is the right to freedom of conscience. Madison's two examples of
faction were thus religious sectarianism and the "unequal distribution of
property," 14 7 and he saw the representative structure of the federal system as
an appropriate way to limit the effect of these forces and thus to heighten the
liberating force of respect for rights both of conscience and property.148 For
the Founders like Madison, the enumerated powers of the federal government
to regulate interstate and international commerce were one with its lack of
power over religion. State regulation of secular interests like commerce and
no regulation of religion were mutually complementary and reenforcing ways
of fostering the civilizing bonds of a community that treats persons as free and
equal.
Conversely, the virtue of moral homogeneity in the city-states of classical
republicanism was, in Madison's view, the key to their indulgence of the vice
of faction, and why:

supra note 64, at 48-106; Moore, supra note 65; D. MILLER, PHILOSOPHY
121, 150-51 (1981).
146. Compare T. PANGLE, supra note 64, at 200-48 (such commerce is nothing short of world
revolutionary), with D. FORBES, HUME'S PHILOSOPHICAL POLITICS 296-98 (1975) (such commerce has
been an essential cause of the growth of public liberty in civilized societies).
147. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 9, at 59 (J. Madison).
148. On the liberating force of capitalist commercial life in early America, see generally J.
APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER (1984).
145.

See, e.g., T.

PANGLE,

AND IDEOLOGY IN HUME'S POLITICAL THOUGHT
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such Democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever
been found incompatible with personal security, or the rights of property; and have
14 9 in
general been as short in their lives, as they have been violent in their deaths.

Such moral homogeneity, in the service of the Aristotelian perfectionism of
classical republicanism, was often factionalized and therefore unjustly
oppressive. Consequently, the moral pluralism of a large nation with diverse
sects and interests was not a vice, but a virtue to be used in the service of the
paramount ends of republican government, respect for rights and the public
good. 150
In effect, the political theory of the United States Constitution urges
skepticism about the politics of virtue and vice. Many of the vices under
classical republicanism (for example, commercial competitiveness and moral
pluralism) were, for the Founders, key ingredients of republican virtue
precisely because they eroded the unrealistic insularity of perfectionist elitism.
Correspondingly, many of the virtues of classical republicanism (for example,
moral homogeneity) were often, at least when enforced on the community at
large, constitutional vices.' 5 '
Society, therefore, has the best reasons to be skeptical about enforcing
moral perfectionism on the community at large. Indeed, protection against
such arguments is most needed in the defense of rights like the right to
privacy, when persons have not had a fair cultural opportunity to participate
as reasonable and equal members of the moral community in the definition of
the moral standards now enforced against them.
Both women and homosexuals have clearly been afflicted by such immoral
exclusion, and indeed have been denied the fair opportunity even to have an
identity on terms of equal respect. The rhetoric of vice is so naturally invoked
against their minimal claims to rights of reproductive and sexual autonomy
because traditional morality has so ignored and denigrated their rights of
moral personality, that any attempt to give value to their lives can be
speciously but plausibly dismissed as "self-evidently" deficient in human
good. Perfectionist theories of virtue and vice are the natural instruments of
such unjust failures of moral imagination that feed on Manichean images
immune to evidence or argument.
It would be constitutionally grotesque to allow such theories to be the
measure of constitutional rights,' 5 2 for such views-precisely when most
popular-bespeak the factionalized hatred of outcasts against which such
rights are the prophylaxis. Liberal constitutionalism, of which the United
States Constitution is a pathbreaking experimental exemplar, insists on the
inalienable right to generate one's own personal ethical vision against the selfblinding claims of majoritarian moral factionalism. That right protects the
149. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 9, at 61 (J. Madison).
150. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 9, at 56 (J. Madison).
151. Cf J. SHKLAR, supra note 64, at 33, 196-97, 233-34 (The basis of constitutional government is
a diffuse distrust of humanity, and is so designed to accommodate any self-interested population.).
152. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 86 (1986). For a criticism, see Richards, Constitutional
Legitimacy and Constitutional Privacy, supra note 99.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 51 : No. I

struggle for an authentic moral voice of groups traditionally silenced as moral
and political heretics. Their heresy against traditional morality is what
dignifies their claim of simple justice for the space-free of criminal penalty
and its stigma-in which to define a moral identity adequate to give value and
dignity to their communities and their lives.
VII
CONCLUSION

Liberal constitutionalism, in contrast to classical republicanism, does not
celebrate political participation as an end in and of itself. Rather, liberal
constitutionalism represents a more complex conception in which persons
may themselves generate and pursue a moral framework that is either
pointedly apolitical, not primarily political, or sharply critical of dominant
moral conceptions embodied in law. Indeed, self-government, in the sense
central to Lockean constitutionalism, achieves its fullest expression in what
has been called full autonomy. This is made possible by a constitutional
culture that restrains the power of the state from interfering with the practice
and expression of values not acceptable to the majoritarian orthodoxy.
The constraints that liberalism thus places on the scope of the criminal law
are not inconsistent with the play of perfectionist ideals in living a good and
ethical life. Many liberals condemn courses of conduct that, in their view, fall
short of an ideal life, although they would not, as a matter of liberal principle,
criminalize such conduct; and they are often prepared to regulate conduct,
including its advertising, that they would not criminally condemn. 153 That
attitude is not at all paradoxical, for it is indeed made possible by the
insistence of liberalism on respect for full autonomy.' 54 It is because persons
are constitutionally guaranteed such full autonomy that they bear so large a
responsibility themselves to decide among the incommensurable ideals of a
good life that flourish in a liberal society. The point of liberalism is neither
that ideals are unimportant, nor that only life, liberty, and property are
important. Rather, the idea is that persons must themselves give value to
living, and that no single perfectionist theory of the proper uses of life,
liberty, and property can be enforced on the community at large, usurping the
moral liberty of the people.
It is fundamental to liberal constitutionalism that it must reject, as the
Founders so clearly saw, the ethical perfectionism of classical republicanism.
Liberal culture does not define ultimate value in democratic politics as
political participation, for its most glorious achievements are its defense, on
grounds of principle, of what classical republicanism made possible but then
ruthlessly crushed-the critical and dissenting moral individualism of Socratic
integrity.
153.
154.

See, e.g.. D. RICHARDS, SEX, DRUGS, DEATH, supra note 6, at 121-25, 189-95.
See generally Richards, Human Rights and Moral Ideals: An Essay on the Moral Theory of Liberalism,

5 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 461 (1980).

